her daughter, whom he desires. As a result Ferenczi finds an analytic mother figure in Groddeck, who offers him the sympathy Freud withholds. Ferenczi subsequently forms his own practice and writing in opposition to Freud. Ferenczi's *Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality* (1924) predates and influences object-oriented psychoanalysis in its emphasis on the mutuality between analyst and analysand and the containing and maternal role of the therapist.

In Chapter 8, Rudnytsky provides the first analysis of Groddeck's *The Book of the It* (1923), arguing that it is a far more coherent and scientific account of the unconscious than Freud's drive theories because it corrects Freud's original misogynistic accounts through its own understanding of womb envy. Groddeck also criticizes the theology of Freud's empire and his authoritarian policing of its psychoanalytic borders.

There are several problems with Rudnytsky's narrative here. Perhaps the most crucial is the way that he relies on psychoanalytic auteurism to tie down the meanings of the texts too neatly. He fails to do the psychoanalytic work and look at the overdetermination in the texts and the possibilities of multiple readings. His disavowal, or at least dismissal, of post-structural literary criticism and psychoanalysis means that he reads the texts and the analysts in schematic, depoliticized and even hysterical ways. Lacan's key re-reading of Freud with Lévi-Strauss revealed not that Freud was a misogynist (whether he was or not is neither here nor there), but that his revelation of the "asymmetry of the signifier," i.e. the notion that culturally there is only the phallus and no signifier of femininity, is itself a cultural critique and accounts for what might be seen as a transhistorical patriarchy. Far from being the agent of patriarchy, then, Freudian psychoanalysis can be a tool for its dismantling, a task addressed by a myriad of feminist critics from Julia Kristeva to Laura Mulvey—critics Rudnytsky barely mentions. In fact, his critique is almost exclusively male centered—he dislikes Melanie Klein and does not give Karen Horney a chapter equivalent to his male idols. Indeed, his emphasis on Freud as the primal father whose sons rebel against him betrays Rudnytsky's own Oedipal anxiety of influence. He also fails to understand how the Third Term in the Oedipus Complex, i.e. the Name of the Father, is the access to law and acculturation. Without the influence of

people other than the mother in the child's life, the child will always be caught in an abject struggle for separation. The neglect of the triad in psychoanalysis is one that reinstates sexism and patriarchy, because it is the hysteria of overvaluing and undervaluing the mother (the Saint and the Whore) that creates women as hysterical projections of male castration. Thus, Rudnytsky performs the patriarchal discourse he would attempt to correct, and his lack of attention to female psychoanalysts supports this.

It is in the final discursive section of the book that Rudnytsky comes into his own. His careful tracing of the relationship between psychoanalysis, evolutionary science and hermeneutics is masterful. He traces the scientific flaws in Freud's thinking—his reliance on drive theory and his dependence on Lamarckian biology. He then argues that, despite Freud's habit of backing the wrong theoretical horse, neuroscience is finding the claims of psychoanalysis ever more convincing. The discovery that dreaming is not after all tied to REM sleep, but rather is an effect of the motivational centers of the brain being unhinged from the rational, makes Freud's dream theory ever more plausible. The increasingly postmodern understanding of brain as function (i.e. synapses and brain connections being made and grown through experience), makes a "resilience" (Rudnytsky's term for a unified theory of science and hermeneutics) possible, as well as an acceptance of many metapsychological insights. Finally, recent clinical understandings of anxiety support Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* (deferred action), a concept that entirely unites the disciplines of hermeneutics and science. For if *Nachträglichkeit,* described by Laplanche as "the enigmatic signifier which is translated and re-translated" is a scientific understanding of how we constantly reinterpret the past in the light of the present, then it also accounts for why we might find truths in the hermeneutic work of translating and retranslating our culture through literature and psychoanalysis.

RULES OF PLAY: GAME DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS

by Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A., 2003. 670 pp., illus. Trade. ISBN: 0-262-24045-9.

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Historically, play and games have been studied in a myriad of ways, from economists using game-like simulations to literary theorists studying the 'play' of meaning in language and literature. These investigations study games or play in the service of another field. Our intent, on the other hand, is to study play and games within the field of game design.

—Katie Salen and
Eric Zimmerman

I expected *Rules of Play* to be about the design of computer or video games, using some specific, well-known examples. But this book takes a more insightful approach. It is not a game design guide and it covers the whole range of games: traditional children's games, board games, alternative games, digital games, etc. A basic assumption of the book is that "Games are as complex as any other form of designed culture; fully to appreciate them means understanding them from multiple perspectives" (p. xiv).

The book is written in a "serious" style, presenting well-researched and framed facts with references to literature and illustrative examples. The writing style came as surprise as well; I had—naively—expected a book on games to be written in a rather entertaining manner. Nevertheless, after getting used to the style, I felt it appropriate, with the exception of some lengthy and redundant explanations in the first half of the book. I appreciated the careful and unpretentious formulations. The authors describe the different aspects of game design from the present state of knowledge, carefully avoiding exaggerated claims, unrealistic assumptions or wishful clarifications.

The book is cleverly structured. There is an overall division between "Core Concepts" and "RULES = the organization of the designed system, PLAY = the human experience of that system, CULTURE = the larger contexts engaged with and inhabited by the system" (p. 6). Each section is divided into chapters and ends with the report of a game designer commissioned to write about his or her game design

process. Every chapter—and this is the part that makes the book an especially valuable resource—ends with a comprehensive, annotated list of further readings and a summarization of important concepts discussed in the chapter. I read the book from beginning to end, but it is also possible to access the content in a less linear manner. Each chapter is written in such a way that it can be well understood if read individually—the examples are always introduced in a concise way, and every reference to previous chapters is clearly indicated.

Here are just a few of the interesting themes and notions found in the book. Chapter 2, "The Design Process," introduces the notion of the iterative design process, emphasizing playtesting as an important aspect of the process. The "Core Concepts" section concerns basic aspects regarding the study of games, such as "Meaningful Play" (the generation of meaning through play) or "The Magic Circle" (the space and time within which the game takes place).

"RULES" starts with the statement that all games have rules. Game design is a second-order design process of "elegant" rules that create experiences. In the chapter "Games as Systems of Uncertainty" the reader learns about commonly held fallacies of player choice. There is also a chapter on "Breaking the Rules," noting that as a designer, it is important to know about different kinds of cheating. The three chapters on framing games, "Information Theory Systems," "Systems of Information" and "Cybernetic Systems," introduce and apply difficult theoretical frameworks too superficially.

"PLAY" is where I definitively started to enjoy the book. The authors define play as free movement in a rigid structure. Pleasure and the double seduction of play, metacommunication within the magic circle, simulation and aspects of reality are interesting aspects discussed. In the chapter "Narrative Play" the primary question is posed as "How are games narratives?" thereby taking a constructive approach and avoiding the "Are games narrative?" debate.

In "CULTURE," the boundaries of the magic circle get blurred. The issues include, for example, the reflection and transformation of culture in games, open culture and how it parallels open source, cultural resistance and different ways for players to modify games. The authors conclude by describing their writing process as pieces

that fell into place and the stepwise resolution of larger patterns. "Having built the system, played it through, and exited on the other side, we find ourselves transformed" (p. 604). This transformation will also occur to those who carefully read the book. The "system" is meaningful and offers a wonderful structure for continuing investigations into game design.

I share the following hope with the authors: "Perhaps as the field matures, the theoretical borrowings that take place in this book will be replaced by more game-centric schools of thought. At least, we certainly hope so" (p. 244).

A THEORY OF /CLOUD/: TOWARD A HISTORY OF PAINTING

by Hubert Damisch. Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, CA, U.S.A., 2002. 313 pp., illus. Trade, paper. ISBN: 0-8047-3439-9; ISBN: 0-8047-3440-2.

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No one can write philosophy-imbued history like the French. As it is sometimes a chore to read for non-native speakers, a translation of such work is always appreciated. The translation of the *Origin of Perspective* made Hubert Damisch's challenging thought available to a wider audience, and now Damisch's even earlier *Théorie du /nuage/,* published in 1972, is also available. Wearing his structural-semiotic methodology on his sleeve, Damisch seeks simply to understand the sign-quality of the cloud, which he holds between slashes to remind the reader that clouds per se are not his interest. His idea is that the cloud exists in Western painting as a complement to the terrestrial reality ordered via perspective. One needs the other to have a full, oppositional meaning.

In a discussion ranging from painting to theology, theater and symbology, Damisch shows how the opposition of celestial-terrestrial is indeed deep. Even when the imagery for the clouds beneath Mantegna's *Christ in His Ascension* in the Uffizi is derived from the roughly suggestive props of a local sacra conversazione, the clouds serve as the means to stake out the alternative space of Christ as against the world below. Perspective, as comprised by lines, and clouds, which resist delineation, mark out two graphic proce-

dures for signifying different realms. The perspective helps build the storia while the cloud suggests a space where stories do not unfold.

Damisch presents a cogent case for the cloud as representing alterity for Renaissance and Baroque painting. The realism of perspective is not pure reference. It enters into a semiotic system with the cloud and takes on meaning as non-celestial, while the cloud takes on meaning as non-terrestrial. Damisch's reminder that clouds and other representational objects are signs in a representational order is a refreshing one and leads one to bring the discussion of naturalism in early modern painting to a more sophisticated level.

It is inevitable that after 30 years many of Damisch's references are a bit dated. He relies on many older authors to build his case, and we cannot fault him for not knowing recent work by John Shearman on clouds and dome imagery. The traditional reader of art history may be turned off by several errors in names and places and chalk it up to the overall speculative nature of Damisch's efforts. But this would be a mistake, as he is interested precisely in the system and not in the details.

Reading Damisch's well-thought-out ideas, it is clear that there is little truth to the occasionally stated idea that Panofsky's iconology brought semiotics into art history. For Panofsky, only the fixed order of antique symbols provides a pull on later use of the same symbols. To be semiotic, however, it is only important that the signs interact in their own order. In this sense, art history has not witnessed its semiotic revolution. Structuralism was one of the most promising social scientific methodologies of the past and certainly ought to have had its insights played out better in art history. Equally striking, however, is Damisch's dogged explanatory attitude. In contrast to the few keepers of semiotics' flame in contemporary art history, Damisch really wants to get down to business. Perhaps until the publication of *The Origin of Perspective* and *Theory of /Cloud/* we did not know quite how to do this. Now we cannot say we have an excuse.

THE MATRIX OF VISUAL CULTURE: WORKING WITH DELEUZE IN FILM THEORY

by Patricia Pisters. Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, CA, U.S.A., 2003. 303 pp. Paper. ISBN: 0-8047-4028-3.